3/10/2023 0 Comments Irad kimhi philosophy![]() ![]() Interestingly, this, coming near the end of Kimhi’s work, is very much where Rödl starts out in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity (p. “In virtue of what is the forceless combination Pa associated with the truth-making relation that a falls under the extension of P, and thus with the claim Pa, rather than with the truth-making relation that a does not fall under P (or falls under the extension of ~P), and this with the opposite claim ~Pa? This question cannot be answered, since Pa does not display and assertion, and therefore there is nothing that associates it with the positive rather than the negative judgment.” (137) But what is it that creates this “association”? How is it associated with the extensional reference to something that exists, as opposed to something that does not exists? For any proposition, Pa, its truth value is associated with the extensional reference to something that exists (the extension is a relation between a and a fact in the world that must obtain). ![]() ![]() Kimhi saves his objection for the third and last chapter of the book. The challenge of Parmenides-how can I say a house is on fire if there is no house on fire-how can I speak of that which does not exist-is not met by this, though. That sign is one of assertoric force: it signifies that something has been asserted, but it remains unrelated to the content of asserted propositions.īy so doing, Frege removes the assertoric force from the logical unity of a thought: Frege’s sign represents merely the acknowledgement that a thought is true. ![]() The closest my keyboard comes to drawing it: |–. To remedy the problem, Frege introduces into his otherwise pristine system of logical notation a sign that has no truth-referential value. For Kimhi, the issue arrives indirectly: the most successful modern attempt at addressing Parmenides’ puzzle about “knowing what is not” has been Frege’s, but Frege’s system of logical notation, depending as it does on a distinction between the intensional force and extensional force of predicates cannot account for the inference: “p”à “A judges p”à “A rightly judges p.” Within the context of “A judges,” “p” takes on a different intensional force (its sense) from when it stands alone, even though its extension (its reference) remains the same it is intension, rather than extension, that permits inference. Rödl and Kimhi (as I will abbreviate the names of the philosophers for the duration) are alike dissatisfied with contemporary analytic philosophy’s inability to make sense of self-consciousness as a ground for all philosophical activity, and for judgment itself. There is nothing, to my mind, as exciting happening in poetry or novels or literature right now as what seems to be happening in philosophy, where a reaffirmation of metaphysics, and a reappraisal of the entire tradition of philosophical thought, is launching forth in a series of monographs this generation of philosophers has ensured McDowell will last as a major figure, by building on, and revising his project, while pursuing a program that is their own. I was alerted to Irad Kimhi’s Thinking and Being before its publication by way of a note in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, and though there are other ways of reading Kimhi’s short work-not least as an ambition to meet Parmenides’ challenge of how it is possible to think what is not, by restoring our understanding of Aristotle, Plato, and Wittgenstein-I found myself appreciating it as a development and deepening of some (but only some) that is latent in Rödl’s latest work. ![]()
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